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Abstract—This paper evaluates the application of a specific 
Belgian mechanism to relief offshore wind power generation 
partially from the imbalance settlement mechanism. A tolerance 
margin for imbalances originating from offshore production 
deviations is installed in which producers and balancing 
responsible parties enjoy beneficial imbalance tariffs. 
This paper investigates background and conditions for this 
regulation in order to determine if such support mechanisms can 
be adequate to boost wind power developments. 
 
Index Terms—imbalance settlement, offshore wind power, 
support mechanism, wind power integration 
I. INTRODUCTION: WIND POWER AND IMBALANCE 
SETTLEMENT 
NE of the main limitation for exploiting large shares of 
wind power generation is its variability. This power 
source depends on a variable input resulting in an output 
characterised by a limited controllability: if no wind is 
available, no active power can be generated. Furthermore, 
wind power is not entirely predictable.  
Wind energy faces an electricity system which needs an 
instant balance between demand and supply. Combined with 
other characteristics as limited storability and variable 
consumption, this requires a certain control over generation 
and/or consumption. Question is thus how to balance large 
amounts of variable generation as wind generation. 
To incentivise system balance, most power systems 
introduced imbalance settlement mechanisms [1]. Therefore, 
all market players operating in the Belgian electricity market 
are obliged to have a contract with a balancing responsible 
party (BRP). This BRP aggregates different market 
participants and maintains its portfolio in balance by ensuring 
that injections match off-takes for every 15 minutes. In order 
for the transmission system operator (TSO) to plan grid 
operations, these positions have to be sent as nominations to 
the TSO before gate closure, generally one day in advance. 
After this deadline, nominations cannot be altered anymore. 
However, some tools exist to manage expected imbalances 
after gate closure due to the availability of new information. 
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These are specifically dealt with in another paper written by 
the author [2].  
When a BRP’s portfolio is not in balance at real-time, the 
BRP has to pay the imbalance tariff for the aggregated 
imbalances in its portfolio. If the total control zone 
(aggregation of all BRPs) is not in balance at real time, the 
TSO, as final responsible for the grid security, activates 
available reserve capacity in order to restore system balance. 
The imbalance settlement mechanism in Belgium is 
transparently available on the website of the TSO [3] and is 
represented in Table 1. If a BRP faces a negative imbalance 
(injections + import + purchase < off-take + export + sales), it 
is said to be short and is consequently required to buy the 
missing electricity from the system operator above market 
price. On the other hand, if the BRPs position is long, it has to 
sell its surplus to Elia under the market price. These imbalance 
tariffs are in best case 92% or 108% of the Belpex Day Ahead 
Market (Belpex DAM) price when the BRP’s imbalance 
counteracts with the system imbalance. In the other case, when 
the imbalance reinforces the system imbalance, the imbalance 
tariff is equal or lower than 92% or equal or higher than 108% 
and introduces an extra uncertain cost (risk) which depends on 
the volume and cost of the activated regulating reserves. 
 
TABLE 1 
IMBALANCE TARIFFS IN THE BELGIAN CONTROL ZONE (SOURCE: ELIA) 
 
Positive system 
imbalance 
Negative system 
imbalance 
Positive 
imbalance 
BRP 
(injection > 
off-take) 
• Max. 0,92 * Belpex DAM 
• Variable tariff 
depending on: 
1. Downward 
regulation volume 
2. Average downward 
regulation price 
3. Activated downward 
regulation price 
0,92 * Belpex DAM 
Negative 
imbalance 
BRP 
(injection < 
off-take) 
1,08 * Belpex DAM 
• Min. 1.08 * Belpex DAM 
• Variable tariff 
depending on: 
1. Upward regulation 
volume 
2. Average upward 
regulation price 
3. Activated upward 
regulation price 
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This system causes consequently an additional cost for 
BRPs with wind power in their portfolio. This results from 
their inability to predict and nominate exactly the injection of 
wind generation. They have to balance their positions with 
available flexible generation (portfolio or on the market) or 
face the imbalance tariff. This is not entirely new to the BRPs 
as they already gained experience with imbalances caused by 
load variations and power plant outages. However, experience 
with variable power sources is still relatively new and 
prediction tools are improving but still inaccurate. For a single 
wind power plant day-ahead output forecasts are characterised 
with a mean absolute error of 20% which may decrease until 5-
7% one or two hours before real-time [4]. 
 To tackle these additional imbalance costs resulting from 
wind power generation, a specific support mechanism is 
introduced in Belgium to promote the integration of offshore 
wind power. A tolerance margin for imbalances resulting from 
this renewable energy source is introduced in which the BRPs 
enjoy reduced imbalance tariffs. 
II. BELGIAN TOLERANCE MARGIN FOR OFFSHORE WIND 
POWER PRODUCTION 
A framework for this tolerance margin was shaped in the 
Royal Decree of 19 December 2002 (Grid Code). Article 317 
introduces the concept for renewable and CHP installations. 
The specific implementation of this article was however not 
yet defined. This was done later by the Royal Decree of March 
30, 2009, stipulating the execution of such tolerance margin 
for offshore wind power generation [5],[6]. This regulation 
came into force June, 3, 2009 and targets specifically 
deviations of production (difference between the nominated 
and the measured output, expressed in kW) originating from 
offshore wind power plants. It is settled per 15 minutes, per 
individual concession (Art. 2, KB 30/03/2009).  
It may be important to clarify the terminology of the 
“production deviation” used in this legislation. The meaning is 
explained in Art. 2 and refers to the difference between the 
nominated and the real-time measured power output. In case of 
wind power, the nominated output is generally determined by 
the predictions. It is important to emphasize the difference 
with the concept of imbalance which refers to the difference 
between injections and off-takes in a BRP’s portfolio: this 
encompasses the aggregation of all generation and load 
deviations. Consequently, a production deviation may be the 
cause of an imbalance in the portfolio but does not necessarily 
needs to when the production deviation is for instance 
counteracted by an opposite demand deviation. 
The core of this regulation is that for an individual offshore 
wind power plant, imbalances originating from offshore 
production deviations (measured minus nominated output) up 
to 30% of the nominated offshore capacity are to be bought or 
sold by Elia respectively at 90% or 110% of the reference 
market price (Belpex DAM). This mechanism is in fact similar 
to the normal imbalance settlement mechanism, except that 
now, when the wind farms’ production deviation reinforces the 
overall system imbalance, higher uncertain tariffs can be 
avoided. The amount of energy which corresponds to a 
production deviation exceeding the 30% margin is again 
subject to the normal imbalance settlement tariffs shown in 
Table 1. 
The mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 1 and Table 2: if for an 
offshore wind power plant, 200 MW is nominated for the first 
part of the day, all deviations inside 140 MW and 260 MW are 
settled with Elia at the advantageous tariff (90% / 110% of the 
Belpex DAM price). A positive imbalance, for instance a real-
time production of 280 MW at 7h00, is only for 20 MW 
subject to the normal imbalance settlement which might be 
higher than 10% of the market reference price. The first 60 
MW however falls within the tolerance margin.  
Table 3 and Table 4 built on the previous example by 
attaching the relevant imbalance tariffs. A situation is assumed 
where a BRP’s imbalance is entirely originating from the 
production deviation  of an offshore wind power plant. This 
wind power plant faces an electricity price of 40 €/MWh on 
the Belpex DAM and imbalance tariffs of 20/60 €/MWh when 
the imbalance reinforces the system imbalance. To simplify the 
example, a settlement period of one hour is taken instead of 15 
minutes. 
Comparing a scenario without (Table 3) and with (Table 4) 
tolerance margin, it can be seen that the regulation is 
specifically advantageous in situations where the BRP’s 
imbalance reinforces the system imbalance. Otherwise, when 
counter-acting on the system imbalance, wind power 
deviations falling under the tolerance margin are paid 
systematically 2% more in comparison with the normal 
settlement mechanism. Although the tolerance margin puts the 
wind power producer in disadvantage in these situations, this is 
largely compensated by the tariff reductions in the other case. 
To ensure grid stability, such support mechanism cannot be 
allowed to harm the incentive of the generator to minimise 
imbalances and to nominate wind generation according to the 
best predictions available. This is assured in the regulation 
with a few specific articles: 
 
 
Fig. 1 Tolerance margin of 30% for offshore nomination of 200 MW 
(0h00-12h00) and 100 MW (12h00-24h00) 
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TABLE 2 
 IMBALANCE TARIFFS IN THE BELGIAN CONTROL ZONE (SOURCE: ELIA) 
 ≤ 30 % 
> 30 % 
Negative 
system 
imbalance 
Positive 
System 
Imbalance 
Positive 
imbalance BRP 
0,90 * Belpex 
DAM 
0,92 * Belpex 
DAM 
≤ 0,92 * Belpex 
DAM 
Negative 
imbalance BRP 
1,10 * Belpex 
DAM 
≥ 1,08 * Belpex 
DAM 
1,08 * Belpex 
DAM 
 
TABLE 3 
IMBALANCE COSTS FOR A WIND FARM WITHOUT 30% TOLERANCE MARGIN 
 
Positive system 
imbalance 
Negative system 
Imbalance 
Positive 
imbalance BRP 
(80 MW) 
80 MW * €20  = €1600 80 MW * 92% * 40€  = 
€2944 
Negative 
imbalance BRP 
(80 MW) 
80 MW * 108% * -40€  = 
€-3456 80 MW * €-60 = €-4800 
 
TABLE 4 
IMBALANCE COSTS FOR A WIND FARM WITH 30% TOLERANCE MARGIN 
 
Positive system 
imbalance 
Negative system 
Imbalance 
Positive 
imbalance BRP 
(80 MW) 
60 MW * 90% * €40 
+ 20 MW * €20 
= €2560 
60 MW * 90% * €40  
+ 20 MW * 92% * €40 
= €2896 
Negative 
imbalance BRP 
(80 MW) 
60 MW * 110% * €-40  
+ 20 MW * 108% * €-20 
= €-3504 
60 MW * 110% * €-40 
+ 20 MW * €-60  
= €-3840 
 
-- The best forecasting tools available at reasonable price 
must be applied (Art. 4) after which the most accurate 
forecasts have to be nominated (Art. 2). Results and methods 
for forecasting must be extensively communicated with the 
grid operator (Art. 4). 
-- The transmission system operator respectively buys or 
sells the surplus or shortage of electrical energy caused by the 
imbalance at the Belpex reference market price (Art. 6) 
decreased or increased with 10%. This means that the 
generator is still penalised for its imbalance and the incentive 
to minimise is maintained. 
-- If the Intra-day Production mechanism is applied, the 
adapted nomination is used as a reference to calculate the 
deviation (Art. 3). The intra-day production mechanism (in 
place from 2009) allows a generator to change its nomination 
intra-day provided that the system operator approves this 
change. The new nomination has to be between the value of 
the last nomination and the prediction at the moment of 
submitting the intra-day nomination.  
These conditions give the generators the incentive to apply 
the best forecasting tools available and reduce its imbalance 
volumes. This support mechanism is merely designed to create 
a financial compensation without worsening the impact on grid 
security. 
A few critical remarks concerning this mechanism are 
however to be made: first the advantageous tariffs are not 
consistent with the tariffs of the imbalance settlement. When 
this regulation was designed the minimum tariffs of the 
imbalance settlement mechanism were 90% or 110% of the 
market reference price. A few years ago, the general imbalance 
tariffs were adapted to 92% and 108% which is not altered in 
the tolerance margin mechanism. This means that this support 
mechanism leads to a systematic disadvantage of 2% in times 
when the offshore wind farm imbalance counteracts with the 
system imbalance. 
A second remark is that the contractual structure of this 
regulation is rather complex (Fig. 2). The imbalance settlement 
mechanism is generally a relation between the BRP and the 
TSO as described in the previous section. This relation is 
largely maintained when applying the 30%-exemption rule 
(Art. 5). The BRP nominates and balances its position and is 
accountable for the aggregated imbalance of its portfolio. 
However, offshore production deviations under 30% of the 
nomination are bought or sold by the TSO from the 
concessionaire (Art. 6). This results in a contractual relation 
between the TSO and the wind farm concessionaire. The 
reference, the nomination is again delivered by the BRP (day-
ahead, intra-day). These nominations submitted by the BRP 
are binding for the wind park concessionaire (Art. 7). 
The complexity of this relationship is that now, the BRP as 
well as the wind park developer become accountable for their 
deviations. Normally, only the BRP bears this responsibility as 
this party nominates the expected production of the wind park. 
In the current situation, also the wind park developer has to 
however contractually agree with the grid operator and the 
BRP to transfer all rights and duties concerning to this rule to 
its BRP (Art. 7). 
A similar tolerance margin was installed in Spain with the 
second regulation (Spanish Royal Decree 436/2004). All wind 
power plants larger than 10 MW applying the feed-in tariff 
were obliged to predict the power output for every 60 minutes 
before 18h00 D-2. The absolute error between prediction and 
production was subject to an imbalance tariff when exceeding 
a tolerance margin of 20% [7]. This support mechanism 
disappeared in the third regulation (Royal Decree 661/2007). 
Wind power imbalances are today treated in the same way as 
under the feed-in premium system, it is namely fully 
responsible for its imbalances. 
 
Fig. 2   Contractual representation of the 30% tolerance margin 
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III.  PREDICTABILITY OF WIND RESOURCES AT OFFSHORE 
LOCATIONS 
In this section, the underlying motivation of the 30%-
mechanism is researched, namely the presumed higher 
unpredictability of wind resources at offshore locations. This 
assumption is often used as an argument by the advocates of 
the mechanism. However, if this larger variability would be 
disproved, the specific support mechanism becomes nothing 
more than a subsidy to boost offshore wind generation. In this 
case, other, more transparent support schemes could be 
considered. 
In order to address this research target, a preliminary 
analysis was performed for the Nord Sea area. Prediction 
errors from five locations in the Netherlands are studied: two 
offshore ones (Vlakte Van De Raan and Lichteiland Goeree) 
are compared with three onshore (Eindhoven, Woensdrecht 
and Stavenisse) (Fig. 3). As these locations are situated in the 
same climate zone, these wind speeds can be assumed 
representative for Belgium.  
Hourly measured wind speeds for these locations are 
obtained from the Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute [8]. 
Statistical parameters describing wind speed characteristics at 
100 m altitude are shown in Table 5. It can be concluded that 
offshore wind locations are characterised by a higher average 
wind speed and standard deviation. 
 Measured wind speeds must be compared with the predicted 
to calculate the prediction error in m/s. Forecast data is 
acquired from ECN (Energieonderzoek Centrum Nederland) 
which is used to perform day-ahead predictions (delivered 
each day around 14h00 for the next 72 hours, 10-minute 
resolution) [9]. When evaluating the prediction error expressed 
in MW, different parameters may be utilised. In literature, 
three common error measures are used [10] to evaluate 
prediction errors expressed in m/s (predicted wind speed – 
measured wind speed): 
 
-- Average error over the evaluation period (BIAS): 
  
, ,
1
1 ( )
N
predicted i measured i
i
BIAS X X
N
=
= −∑  
-- Mean Absolute Error (MAE): 
  
, ,
1
1 | |
N
predicted i measured i
i
MAE X X
N
=
= −∑  
-- Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) 
   
, ,
1
1 ( )²
N
predicted i measured i
i
RMSE X X
N
=
= −∑
 
 
Table 6 shows these statistical parameters of the wind speed 
prediction error expressed in m/s. For the five locations, the 
statistical indicators are always larger for the offshore 
locations than the onshore. Therefore, it may already be 
concluded that offshore wind speeds seem to be indeed less 
predictable.  
 
 
Fig. 3   Geographical representation of the three locations of measurement 
 
TABLE 5 
STATISTICAL PARAMETERS OF THE MEASURED WIND SPEEDS AT 100 METERS 
HEIGHT (2004) 
[m./sec.] DE RAAN GOEREE STAVENISSE WOENSDR. EINDHOVEN 
Mean 9,18 9,41 7,50 5,78 5,90 
St.dev. 4,67 4,85 4,07 3,65 3,43 
Max. 28,20 28,84 28,58 25,00 23,88 
     
 
TABLE 6 
STATISTICAL PARAMETERS OF THE WIND SPEED PREDICTION ERROR 
[m./sec.] DE RAAN GOEREE STAVENISSE WOENSDR. EINDHOVEN 
BIAS -0,74 -0,87 0,16 0,57 0,65 
MAE 2,10 2,01 1,77 1,89 1,81 
RMSE 2,70 2,60 2,29 2,35 2,26 
IV. IMBALANCES ORIGINATING FROM THE PRODUCTION 
DEVIATIONS OF AN OFFSHORE WIND POWER PLANT 
The production deviation of a single wind power plant is 
calculated by subtracting the nominated (day-ahead, intra-day) 
from the measured active power output. Nominations are 
generally based on wind speed predictions and the measured 
output is normally in function of the measured wind speed. In 
this case-study, the BRP’s imbalance is assumed equal to the 
production deviation. This means that the portfolio or intra-
day balancing possibilities are not taken into account. 
In order to transform the wind speeds to active power, a 
power curve is used which represents the output characteristics 
of a wind turbine, farm or park. For this study, normalised, 
regional aggregated power curves from the TradeWind project 
are used representing current technology [11]. When 
evaluating the output of a farm or park, these curves are more 
realistic than the use of individual power curves as they take 
into account wind park effects (wake, electrical losses, 
unavailability). This result in smoother curves (not all turbines 
start generating power at the same time), lower active power 
output (aerodynamical and electrical losses, unavailability,...) 
and a smooth decrease in power output in case of high wind 
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speeds (not all wind turbines shut down at the same time 
during a storm). This is shown in Fig. 3. 
When production deviations are calculated as the predicted 
minus the measured output, a negative prediction error means 
that the wind speed was underestimated leading to a positive 
imbalance. The BRP is long and needs to balance its position 
or to sell the imbalanced volume to the system operator below 
market price. A negative imbalance means the BRP is short 
and has to buy reserves from the system operator. 
Results may be evaluated with the same statistical 
parameters as in Table 6. However, in order to make results 
independent from the wind farm or park size, the normalised 
error measures can be used by dividing the imbalances by the 
installed capacity. When evaluating the results shown in Table 
7, the main conclusion is that the higher unpredictability 
offshore can be confirmed when looking at the absolute 
production deviations. A second remark is that the BIAS-
indicator reveals systematic underestimations offshore and 
overestimations onshore. When looking at the probabilistic 
distribution of the absolute imbalance error in Fig. 4, it can be 
seen that small imbalances (< 20%) occur more in the onshore 
locations while larger imbalances occur more in the offshore 
locations. 
With these results it is not possible to reject the assumption 
of higher unpredictability and consequently higher imbalance 
volumes and costs offshore. However it is important to keep in 
mind that the difference is not that large and that the study is 
performed on a small population of five locations. Second, one 
can argue that offshore prediction tools are relatively new and 
more improvement in accuracy is expected in comparison with 
the more mature onshore prediction tools.  
 
 
FIG. 3  REGIONAL NORMALISED POWER CURVES (SOURCE: TRADEWIND) 
 
 
TABLE 7 
NORMALISED STATISTICAL PARAMETERS CONCERNING IMBALANCE OF AN 
OFFSHORE WIND POWER PLANT   
[%] DE RAAN GOEREE STAVENISSE WOENSDR. EINDHOVEN 
NBIAS -5,05 -5,53 1,41 1,11 2,75 
NMAE 13,07 12,28 10,76 8,54 8,97 
NRMSE 19,39 18,53 16,66 13,13 13,95 
NMAX 79,26 89,00 78,96 66,32 80,39 
 
 
 
 FIG. 4  PROBABILITY FUNCTION OF NORMALISED IMBALANCES 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this paper is to review the specific Belgian 
support mechanism to reduce imbalance costs for offshore 
wind power. This mechanism allow offshore generators to 
enjoy beneficial imbalance tariffs when deviations stay inside 
a 30% tolerance margin. This is defended by the higher 
unpredictability of active power output offshore.   
A preliminary study with five offshore and onshore 
locations confirms this argumentation with prediction errors 
(RMSE) being 2-6% higher for offshore locations. 
Consequently, this increases imbalance costs and could indeed 
discourage wind park developers to invest in offshore 
locations.  
Although this support mechanism can be defended as it 
directly tackles the imbalance cost, this regulation is anything 
but transparent. The complexity of the execution of this 
regulation raises the question if this support mechanism for 
offshore wind generation could not be replaced by other easier, 
more transparent support mechanisms. The same support effect 
could for instance be achieved by increasing the minimal price 
of the green certificates received for offshore wind power.  
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